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MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ERIE DOCTRINE IN DIVERSITY CASES
PHILIP B. KURLANDt
QUESTIONS of federal jurisdiction, for many people, involve no more than
the application of technical formulae created only to confuse the uninitiated.
More sophisticated students of government understand that these problems
involve fundamental questions of power, and that the existence of democracy
depends in no small part upon the proper allocation of such authority. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's position is clear. His writings, both as a professor and
as a judge, have been concerned to a large extent with these issues: whether,
within the constitutional framework, authority is properly vested in the state
or the federal judiciary, and whether, in that scheme, power properly belongs
to the federal judiciary or to some other branch of the federal government.
A single aspect of the subject generally labelled federal jurisdiction will be
examined in this Article: the extent to which the federal courts should be free
to decide questions of law arising in diversity cases and how these questions
should he answered. To deal solely with the writings of Justice Frankfurter
in this area, however, would be to distort both the problems and his judgments
concerning them. Although his professorial writings may well express his
individual views, his actions on the Court are clearly those of an individual
acting within the restraints imposed by the nature of that institution, indeed
of an individual thoroughly cognizant of the needs for such restraints. A
Supreme Court opinion, Frankfurter has said, is "an orchestral and not a
solo performance."'2 A Justice whose name does not appear as the author of
an opinion may, nonetheless, have made a substantial contribution to it.
Opinions which do bear his name, when he does not write for himself alone,
reflect not only his own views but those of the other members of the Court
who have joined in his expression of judgment. Even when the name of but
a single Justice appears on a dissent or concurrence, the opinion was necessarily
expressed in response to the demand of other opinions, written differently.
Opinions authored by Mr. Justice Frankfurter are among the most uin-.
portant in the development of the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.3 To name
but two, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 4 and Angel v. Bullington,5 is sufficient
to prove the point. Indeed, the governing doctrine might be better described
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This Article is the first part of a consideration of problems arising under the Erie
doctrine. The second will appear in the Yale Law Journal in a later issue.
1. See, e.g., Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 274
(1957).
2. FRANKFURTER, THE CoiuimcE CLAUsE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
43 (1937).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
5. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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if it took its name from York rather than Erie. Appreciation of the significance
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions on this subject, however, requires a
consideration of all the relevant opinions of the Court since Erie, an approach
which is possible because the development of the Erie rule has taken place
almost entirely during the Justice's tenure on the Court. Accordingly, this
Article will not be confined to opinions on which the Justice's name appears.
The absence of his name on an opinion does not, of course, mean that he had
no part in its shaping. On the other hand, the importance to be attached
to those opinions which he has authored should not be deemed an attribution
to him alone of responsibility for their content. While he has had one of the
more important roles in the symphony performance, his exact contribution
to the formulation of the doctrine cannot be ascertained with fine accuracy,
however many memoranda are left behind by those who have served on the
Court with him. Not even the "behavioral sciences," with which the law
schools are now in such close collaboration, can provide an answer here.
In the area of federal jurisdiction, however, more than elsewhere in his
judicial writings, the Justice's opinions may be said to reflect his personal
beliefs-the result of many years of diligent scholarship-as well as his
official views.
6
ERIE AND THE CONSTITUTION
the gratuitous courage of the Court and the fluidity
of the Constitution." -51 HARv. L. REv. 1245 (1938).
"For me, what is said has not a little kinship with the
pronouncements of the Delphic oracle."
-Frankfurter, J., concurring and dissenting in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427,439 (1956).
The right answer, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is fond of reminding us, often
depends upon the right question.7 No more vivid demonstration of the truth
of this dictum has been written into our law than the Court's opinion in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. "The question for decision," wrote Mr. Justice
Brandeis, "is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall
now be disapproved."8 It was a good question, one without which the Court
could not have overturned "a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly
a century."9 But it was not the question raised by the parties to the litigation
nor one to which an answer was required by the .facts of the case.' 0 Mr.
6. Cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943).
7. See, e.g., Frankfurter, J., concurring in Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v.
Green, 329 U.S. 156, 170 (1946) : "Putting the wrong question is not likely to beget right
answers even in law."
8. 304 U.S. at 69. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
9. 304 U.S. at 77.
10. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Butler, id. at 80; Hart, The Business of
the :Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 HIv. L. REv. 579, 610
(1940).
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Justice Brandeis, however, with the "right" answer at hand, and "motivated"
by his "devotion to the federal principle," deemed it appropriate to frame the
"right" question."1
Just as Professor Gray has "explained" why Story wrote the opinion
he did in Swift v. Tyson,12 speculation is possible on why Mr. Justice Brandeis
reached for this question in contradiction of his own first principles.' 3 Did
Brandeis recognize Erie as his last chance to uproot Swift v. Tyson before
his imminent retirement? If so, why did he pass up the same opportunity
a few weeks earlier by concurring in an opinion for the Court by Mr. Justice
Butler, which applied federal general common law to the question whether a
presumption of suicide existed in a suit on an insurance policy? 14
Whatever the reasons, Brandeis's unusual conduct was the more extraordi-
nary; for, contrary to the policies he had carefully enunciated, 5 he chose
to rest his case on the resolution of a constitutional issue which could have
been avoided:
"If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should
not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout
nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has
now been made clear and compels us to do so."16
This unconstitutionality of the application of federal judge-made law in
diversity cases was grounded on the views earlier expressed in dissents by
Mr. Justice Field in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, and by Mr. Justice
11. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 58 (1949) ; see also Freund,
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE 99, 111-12 (Dunham & Kurland ed. 1956). It will
surprise some that the Erie opinion, certainly as important as any written by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, is not mentioned in his most recent full-length biography. See MASON, BRANDEIS:
A FREE 'AN'S LIFE (1946).
12. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 253 (2d ed. 1921).
13. E.g.: "Justice Brandeis himself has been considered by an authoritative inter-
preter to have a strong conviction of the value of decentralization and the need for guarding
the power of the states in their sphere. [Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Con-
stitution, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 47, 84-85 (1932).] We may guess that the venerable
but determined justice had made up his mind that without waiting for the gradual process
of corrosion, a suitable occasion should be seized to destroy root and branch the heresy
of 'general law.'
"As a 'good war sanctifies any cause' almost any opportunity might be suitable to such
a purpose." McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts,
33 ILL. L. REv. 126, 131-32 (1938).
14. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161 (1938). Mr. Justice Black
dissented on the ground that state law should control and the result reached by the
majority was inconsistent with the law of the state. Id. at 172.
15. See, especially, Brandeis, J., concurring in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-
48 (1936). Cf. Freund, Introduction to THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MIL JUSTICE
BRANDEIS xvi-xvii (Bickel ed. 1957).
16. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
17. 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893).
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Holmes in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.'8 and Black & White Taxicab Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.19 Brandeis's conclusion was that:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its legislature in
a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. [20] There is no federal general common law. Congress has
no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they com-
mercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such power on the federal courts.
...... In disapproving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional
§ 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, or any other Act of Congress.
We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower
courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several States."2'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was not yet a member of the Court which thus
razed the elaborate structure built on the cornerstone of Swift v. Tyson. Mr.
Justice Black, the only member of the Court now serving who participated
in the Erie decision, joined the Brandeis opinion. Mr. justice Reed,
in what may yet prove to be his most important opinion, concurred in
the reversal of Swift v. Tyson but disagreed with the constitutional approach
used by the majority:
"The 'unconstitutional' course referred to in the majority opinion is
apparently the ruling in Swift v. Tyson that the supposed omission of
Congress to legislate as to the effect of decisions leaves federal courts free
18. 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910).
19. 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928). The Holmes theory may be read as an assertion of
a constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the judicial and legislative
branches of the federal government rather than between national and state functions.
20. Had he stopped here, Mr. Justice Brandeis might have resolved the problems
created by Swift v. Tysonr without raising the specter of constitutional limitation on
federal power, a ghost then but recently laid to rest after the Roosevelt Court fight.
21. 304 U.S. at 78-80. Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act read as follows: "[T]he
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Act of Sept.
24, 1789, c. XX, § 34, 1 STAT. 92. In Swift v. Tyson, Story, J., wrote an opinion for the
Court, which held that "the laws of the several states" meant "local statutes or local usages"
.and not judicial decisions. In 1923, Charles Warren demonstrated that the writers of § 34
did not mean to restrict "laws" so narrowly but intended to include decisional law as well
as statutory law. Warrenj New Light on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARv. L. RFv. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923).
The 1948 codification of this section reads as follows: "The laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply." 62 STAT. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1952).
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to interpret general law for themselves. I am not at all sure whether, in
the absence of federal statutory direction, federal courts would be com-
pelled to follow state decisions. There was sufficient doubt about the
matter in 1789 to induce the first Congress to legislate. No former
opinions of this Court have passed upon it. Mr. Justice Holmes evidently
saw nothing 'unconstitutional' which required the overruling of Swift v.
Tyson, for he said in the very opinion quoted by the majority, 'I should
leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed, as I indicated in Kuhn v. Fairmont
Coal Co., but I would not allow it to spread the assumed dominion into
new fields.' ... If the opinion commits this Court to the position that the
Congress is without power to declare what rules of substantive law shall
govern federal courts, that conclusion also seems questionable ...
The Judiciary Article and the 'necessary and proper' clause of Article
One may fully authorize legislation, such as this section of the Judiciary
Act." 22
In the almost twenty years since Erie, the Supreme Court has shed little
more light on this subject. All of the cases decided on the basis of the Erie
doctrine have been resolved in a manner which avoided the need to examine
its relationship to the Constitution. Mr. Justice Brandeis himself indicated
that the parties could, in effect, substitute federal "general" law for the applic-
able law of the appropriate state simply by relying "almost entirely on federal
precedents. '2 3 Yet permitting the parties in a law suit to license the federal
courts to ignore state law is hardly consistent with recognition of a constitu-
tional barrier, since the interest, if any, which is constitutionally protected
belongs to the state, not to an individual.
In his dissent in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,24 Mr. Justice Rutledge
charged that the majority position expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
sounded like constitutional doctrine. Presumably the suspect language is:
"In overruling Swift v. Tyson. . . .Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins did not
merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a particular way of looking
at law which dominated the judicial process long after its inadequacies
had been laid bare .... Law was conceived as a 'brooding omnipresence'
of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence and not themselves
the controlling formulations. Accordingly, federal courts deemed them-
selves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore Law, required wholly
independent of authoritatively declared State law, even in cases where a
legal right as the basis for relief was created by State authority and could
not be created by federal authority and the case got into the federal court
merely because it was 'between Citizens of different States' under Art.
III, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
2 5
This is a slim fragment on which to base a conclusion of the sort suggested
by Mr. Justice Rutledge, but straws are necessary for the making of bricks.
York was, apart from this language, the culmination of a series of cases
that might have afforded an answer to the constitutional question. Section
22. 304 U.S. at 91-92.
23. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938).
24. 326 U.S. at 114.
25. Id. at 101-02. (Emphasis added.) See also text following note 32 infra.
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thirty-four provided for the application of state rules of decision only in
"trials at common law."' 26 This language would seem clearly not to include
suits in equity. On the other hand, the constitutional thesis would be equally
applicable to actions at law or in equity. Thus, if the Court were compelled
to apply the doctrine in equity cases as well as actions at law, the mandate
could come from the Constitution but not from the language of the statute.
Almost immediately after Erie was handed down, the Court decided the
question of the rule's application to equity cases. Mr. Justice Reed, writing
for a unanimous Court, said, rather elliptically, in Ruhlin v. New York Life
Ins. Co.: "The doctrine applies though the question of construction arises
not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity. ' 27 In the face of his very
recent dissent, he was unlikely to be asserting that Erie was, after all, a con-
stitutional doctrine. But shortly thereafter, in a nondiversity case, Mr.
Justice Stone, speaking for seven of the eight members of the Court who
participated in the decision, seemed to affirm the suggested distinction between
the compulsion of the statute and that of the Constitution. In Russell v. Todd,
he wrote:
"The Rules of Decision Act does not apply to suits in equity ...
". ... In the circumstances we have no occasion to consider the extent
to which federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred upon
them by Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to follow
state statutes and decisions affecting those remedies.
'26
At the next term of Court, in a case involving the enforceability of a
Totten trust pursuant to a New Jersey statute, the question arose whether
the federal courts had to follow decisions of the New Jersey court of chancery
to the effect that such a trust was not enforceable despite the very specific
language of the statute. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
held that they did. Without any reference to the "equity" question, the unani-
mous Court applied the Erie principle: "It is inadmissible that there should
be one rule of state law for litigants in the state courts and another rule for
litigants who bring the same question before the federal courts owing to the
circumstances of diversity of citizenship." 2 On the same day, however, Mr.
Justice Stone delivered an opinion for the Court in which he suggested a
refinement of the doctrine: "Since the equitable relief sought in this suit is
predicated upon petitioners' legal rights growing out of respondent's unlawful
transfer of the stock to the assignee of the life tenant, the state 'laws' which,
by § 34, . . .are made 'the rules of decision in trials at common law' define
the nature and extent of petitioners' right."30 Accordingly, equity followed the
26. See note 21 supra.
27. 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938).
28. 309 U.S. 280, 287, 294 (1940).
29. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 180 (1940). See the reference
to § 34, or the guiding rule, id. at 177 n.3. See also Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S.
208 (1939).
30. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940).
[Vol. 67 :187
1957] JUSTICE FRANKFURTER-THE ERIE DOCTRINE 193
law in those cases "predicated upon ... legal rights," and the law followed
state laws of decision because of section thirty-four. The rule to be applied to
purely equitable cases was thus left undetermined; apparently, the only com-
pulsion on the Court in this context would come from the Constitution. But
in the same term, the doctrine was applied, probably erroneously, to a statutory
interpleader action, again without reference to this issue.3'
This was the posture of the law when Guaranty Trust Co. v. York arrived
at the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on behalf of the Court, re-
solved the problem without finding resort to the Constitution necessary:
"In exercising their jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizen-
ship, the federal courts, in the long course of their history, have not differ-
entiated in their regard for State law between actions at law and suits
in equity. Although § 34 ... directed that the 'laws of the several states
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law ... '
this was deemed, consistently for over a hundred years, to be merely
declaratory of what would in any event have governed the federal courts
and therefore was equally applicable to equity suits.... Indeed, it may
fairly be said that the federal courts gave greater respect to State-created
'substantive rights' . . . in equity than they gave them on the law side,
because rights at law were usually declared by State courts and as such
increasingly flouted by extension of the doctrine in Swift v. Tyson, while
rights in equity were frequently defined by legislative enactment and as
such known and respected by the federal courts ...
...... In giving federal courts 'cognizance' of equity suits in cases of
diversity jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts
ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights created by State law
or to create substantive rights denied by State law." 2
In this last sentence, at least, is a hint of a congressional power that by impli-
cation denies both the constitutional thesis put forward in Erie and the inter-
pretation of York by Mr. Justice Rutledge. With the statute now amended
to apply to all "civil actions, '3 3 the possibility of distinguishing between the
constitutional command and that of Congress has disappeared. The Erie rule
is today clearly applicable in equity cases by act of the legislature, though the
act may be redundant.
Ten years after York, the constitutional problem was raised more directly
but again treated tangentially. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,3 4 the question
was whether the federal courts were bound, in a diversity suit, to follow
ancient Vermont authorities which refused to honor arbitration clauses in con-
tracts between the litigating parties. The respondent argued that the right
to a stay of the judicial proceedings, sought to permit the arbitration hearings
to proceed, was a question governed by the terms of section three of the Fed-
31. Griffin v. MeCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). See Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the
Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210, 1236 n.62 (1946).
32. 326 U.S. at 103-05. (Emphasis added.)
33. See note 21 supra.
34. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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eral Arbitration Act.35 On this point, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, said:
"If respondent's contention is correct, a constitutional question might be
presented. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not have
the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to contro-
versies in diversity of citizenship cases.... Our view, as will be developed,
is that § 3, so read, would invade the local law field. We therefore read
§ 3 narrowly to avoid that issue."
30
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, agreed with this approach:
"In view of the ground that was taken in that case for its decision, it
would raise a serious question of constitutional law whether Congress
could subject to arbitration litigation in the federal courts which is there
solely because it is 'between Citizens of different States,' . . . in disregard
of the law of the State in which a federal court is sitting. Since the United
States Arbitration Act of 1925 does not obviously apply to diversity cases,
in light of its terms and relevant interpretive materials, avoidance of the
constitutional question is for me sufficiently compelling to lead to a con-
struction of the Act as not applicable to diversity cases. Of course this
implies no opinion on the constitutional question that would be presented
were Congress specifically to make the Arbitration Act applicable in such
cases."
3 7
The difference between the two opinions on this point is that the majority
found that application of the Arbitration Act "might" present a constitutional
question, while Mr. Justice Frankfurter believed that it "would" present such
an issue. Those who would find that these expressions of doubt support "the
view that the disability is constitutional," however, are grasping at straws.
2 8
In still another case, where the Court was silent on the point, the constitu-
tional question noted in Bernhardt might have been tacitly resolved. Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. involved a direct conflict between a
state statute and rule three of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.30 The
former provided that actions were begun with the service of summons; the
latter deemed an action commenced when the complaint was filed. In Ragan,
the statute of limitations had run after the filing of the complaint in the federal
district court but before the service of summons. In a rather mechanical opinion,
without a hint of the possible constitutional issue involved, Mr. Justice Doug-
las, on behalf of a majority which included Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that
the issue was governed by state law and the claim barred, although the plain-
tiff had complied with all the requirements to begin an action in the federal
court prior to the expiration of the limiting period. The constitutional question
35. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
36. 350 U.S. at 202.
37. Id. at 208.
38. 'See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rides for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 799 n.9 (1957).
39. 337 U.S. 530 (1949) ; cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949) (dissenting opinions by Justices Douglas (Frankfurter joining) and Rutledge;
FED. R. Crv. P. 23).
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might have been resolved sub silentio in any of several ways consistent with
this conclusion. The Court might have held that the constitutional base for
Erie required the application of state law;40 or that rule three was intended
to be subordinate to state law and therefore no conflict really existed, a difficult
construction to sustain; or that the constitutional question was not present
because, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter said elsewhere on behalf of himself and
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy, "the Rules are not acts of Congress and
cannot be treated as such,"' another means of concluding that no conflict ex-
isted. But so far as the opinion reveals, the Court chose to ignore the issue.
The decisions of the Court since Erie might be searched in an attempt to
discover whether the rationale for the existence of the diversity clause in the
Constitution offers a solution to this problem. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
asserted, with the concurrence of some of his brethren, that article three should
be treated as static and unchanging in its meaning. 42 So viewed, the problem
is one of discovering what the language of this article meant to those to whom
it was addressed in the late eighteenth century. If, on the other hand, article
three is to be treated like the less specific clauses of the Constitution-"due
process," "equal protection of the laws," "Commerce ... between the States"
-the problem is to ascertain the contemporary significance of this portion of
the judiciary article.
Several theories have been offered on the original meaning. In Professor
Crosskey's opinion, the federal judiciary clearly was intended to be supreme
in making law to govern cases brought before both federal and state courts.
43
Under this theory, Erie is the unconstitutional judicial decision, not Swift
v. Tyson. No recent decision of the Court supports this thesis. To Mr. Friend-
ly, the diversity clause was designed to create a forum more sympathetic to
the commercial interests in the country than were either the state legislatures
or courts.44 To Professor Yntema and Mr. Jaffin, the clause was meant to
make available a forum in which noncitizens would be treated fairly.4 5 Profes-
sor Hart, somewhat derisively, suggests:
40. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTE 674
(1953) (hereinafter cited as HART & WEcHs=a).
41. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
42. See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-47, 654 (1949). See also Vinson, C.J., dissenting, id. at 645. But see
Jackson, J., id. at 585-86; Rudiedge, 3., concurring, id. at 619-20.
43. See 1 CROSSXEY, PoLn'ICS AND THE CONSTiTUTION chapters XVIII-XXI (1953);
2 id. chapters XXIII-XXVI.
44. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483, 496-
97 (1928) : "In summary, we may say that the desire to protect creditors against legislation
favorable to debtors was a principle reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction, and
that as a reason it was by no means without validity."
45. Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent .urisdiction, 79 U. PA. L.
REv. 869 (1931). Professor Frankfurter, as he then was, wrote a reply in defense of the
Friendly thesis. Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-In Reply to Professor
1"nteina, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1097 (1931).
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"It must be inferred that the present members of the Supreme Court
believe that the framers of the diversity clause, and the successive
Congresses which have acted under it, were moved only by a desire to
afford out-of-state litigants the protection of the superior, or potentially
superior, personnel, fact-finding processes and housekeeping rules of the
federal courts. ' 46
If the Court accepts the Friendly theory, it must recognize a power in the
federal government to make rules of decision for diversity cases. On the other
hand, the agreement by the Court with the Yntema thesis could be an indica-
tion of a constitutional barrier to the exercise of such power. And the Yntema
view apparently has prevailed, in the Court's language if not its judgments,
almost from the beginning.
47
Although expressions of doubt have occasionally appeared in the Court's
recent opinions,48 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement in his opinion in Lum-
bermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert is not untypical of the approach now gener-
ally taken by the Court:
"The stuff of diversity jurisdiction is state litigation. The availability
of federal tribunals for controversies concerning matters which in them-
selves are outside federal power and exclusively within state authority, is
the essence of a jurisdiction solely resting on the fact that a plaintiff and
a defendant are citizens of different States. The power of Congress to
confer such jurisdiction was based on the desire of the Framers to assure
out-of-state litigants courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias.
That the supposed justification for this fear was not rooted in weighty
experience is attested by the fact that so ardent a nationalist as Marshall
gave that proposal of the Philadelphia Convention only tepid support in
the Virginia Convention. 3 Elliott's Debates 556 (1891). But in any event,
whatever 'fears and apprehensions' were entertained by the Framers and
ratifiers, there was fear that parochial prejudice by the citizens of one
State toward those of another, as well as toward aliens, would lead to
unjust treatment of citizens of other States and foreign countries."4 9
Such an approach to the history of the diversity clause leans on the side of a
constitutional base for the Erie rule.
If the historical approach is rejected, the issue turns on a consideration of
the function diversity jurisdiction does or should perform in the modem
American nation.50 The question becomes more difficult, for by far the most
persuasive argument is that diversity jurisdiction serves no constructive func-
46. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 4S9, 512
n.77 (1954). For another construction, see text following note 76 infra.
47. See Marshall, C.J., in Bank v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 36, 50 (1809) ; Story,
J., in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 141, 160 (1816).
48. See, e.g., Rutledge, J., in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337
U.S. 582, 622 (1949).
49. 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.) Cf. text at
note 60 infra.
50. See HART & W csi.x 896-97.
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tion worth preserving.5 The best defense of diversity jurisdiction lies in
the relief it offers state courts from a large number of cases which many state
systems are in no condition to absorb . 2 The once superior procedure of the
federal courts is slowly but surely losing its advantage as the states amend
their codes of procedure. The once superior quality of the federal judiciary
has disappeared-in part because of the increase in numbers and in part be-
cause the income tax so largely forecloses accumulation of capital by practicing
lawyers that persuading first-rate counsel to become trial judges in the federal
system is now as difficult as convincing able lawyers to accept nominations
to the state bench. Diversity jurisdiction provides advantages to big-city law-
yers to the extent the district courts and courts of appeals hold their sessions
in the large cities within their districts and circuits. But the system is also
more expensive. In some measure the federal courts offer juries chosen from
a broader geographical base and, generally, from a group of higher economic
and social status. Evaluation of this factor depends on the conception of the
jury and its function in our judicial system. None of these considerations
seems to justify the existence of diversity jurisdiction in our federal system
today.5 3 Moreover, so long as the issue remains in the realm of speculation,
foreclosing ultimate exercise of federal power by adopting Erie's constitutional
theme would certainly be unwise.
Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of diversity jurisdiction, the
Court's decisions offer little guidance as to the position it will adopt if called
upon to determine whether Erie announces a constitutional limitation on the
power of Congress and the federal courts. In the course of treating other
problems, various members of the Court have issued relevant dicta. Some
are clear, like Mr. Justice Douglas's statement in Ullmann v. United States:
"[T]his Court has always been willing to re-examine and overrule con-
stitutional precedent, even those old and established. In Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins... this Court overruled Swift v. Tyson ... which had been a
rule of decision for 95 years." 54
Others are more ambiguous, like Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement in the
Tidewater case:
"We are here concerned with the power of the federal courts to ad-
judicate merely because of the citizenship of the parties. Power to
51. See Frankfurter, J., concurring in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S.
48, 54 (1954) ; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 216, 235-36 (1948).
52. For example, the trial courts in Cook County, Illinois are presently some four
to five years behind on their trial calendars. To place the additional burden on them
of handling the cases which are now filed in the federal court under diversity jurisdiction
would be to cause a breakdown of the Illinois judicial system.
53. The best arguments that could be mustered in favor of retaining diversity juris-
diction were not very good when first offered. See, e.g., Bigelow, Sears, Eagleton, Kent,
Tefft & Hinton, Limiting Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 31 MicHa. L. REv. 59, 64-65
(1932). They have lost all their validity in the interim, in large measure due to Erie and
the bankruptcy laws.
54. 350 U.S. 422, 455 (1956) (dissenting opinion). But see text at note 35 supra.
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adjudicate between citizens of different states, merely because they are
citizens of different states, has no relation to any substantive rights created
by Congress." 55
This, of course, might be an historically accurate statement if it means that
Congress has not legislated substantive rules of decision for application
in diversity cases. On the other hand, the statement may be construed as a
limit on congressional power. But if "one of the most treacherous tendencies
in legal reasoning is the transfer of generalizations developed for one set of
situations to seemingly analogous, yet essentially different, situations," 50 equal-
ly dangerous is the use of a dictum to answer a question which was not before
the Court when the statement was made.
Since relevant assertions are, nevertheless, ammunition which an advocate
can put to good use, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views might be garnered from
some of his pre-judicial writings. When he was still Professor Frankfurter, he
wrote an article that would seem to deny a constitutional base for Erie. In
1928, shortly after the Taxicab case, 57 he made it clear that he agreed with the
Brandeis-Holmes thesis that Swift v. Tyson ought to be removed from the
books.5 8 But he would have left it to Congress to wield the eraser:
"Whatever is to remain of diversity jurisdiction, the law to be admini-
stered by the federal courts is the law of the states. Whenever that law
is authentically declared by the state, either by legislation or adjudication,
state law ought to govern in state litigation, whether the forum of applica-
tion is a state or federal court. Swift v. Tyson, with all its offspring, is
mischievous in its consequences, baffling in its application, untenable in
theory, and, as Mr. Charles Warren recently proved, a perversion of the
framers of the First Judiciary Act. It results in two independent law-
makers within the same state emitting conflicting rules concerning the
same transactions. The fortuitous circumstance of residence of one of
the parties at the time of the suit determines what rule is to prevail in
particular litigation."5 9
Then, after applauding Holmes's dissent in the Taxicab case-including its
reference to the constitutional problem-and rejecting the argument of uni-
formity as a reason for retaining Swift v. Tyson, he concluded:
"[W]hether the roots of the doctrine be in rational theory or obscure
impulse, it is now too strongly imbedded in our law for judicial self-
55. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650 (1954)
(dissenting opinion). See also text at notes 25, 32, 37 supra.
56. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590, 603
(1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
57. 276 U.S. at 532.
58. Mr. Justice Cardozo's name should be added to this list, though characteristically
he seemed to be satisfied with the gradual erosion of the Swift rule. See Hawks v. Hamill,
288 U.S. 52 (1933), and the comment thereon in Frankfurter & Hart, The Buiness of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1932, 47 HARv. L. REv. 245, 289-91 (1933). See also
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335 (1934); Frankfurter & Hart, The Business
of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARv. L. Rm,. 68, 92 (1935).
59. Frankfurter, Distribution of Jidicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 499, 526-27 (1928).
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correction. Legislation should remove this doctrine, which, though derived
from diverse-citizenship jurisdiction, denies its basis. For non-resident
litigants were given a federal tribunal to secure a fair administration of
state law, not the administration of independent law."60
Such a conclusion, as Mr. Justice Reed argued in his concurring opinion with
regard to Holmes's dissent in the Taxicab case, cannot be reconciled with the
Brandeis thesis as to the constitutional nature of the Erie doctrine. But Mr.
Justice Frankfurter may no longer hold this view. His opinion in Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert could reflect a change of position.61
In any event, the solution seems to be easier for occupants of academic
chairs than for those on the bench. Whether Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views
on this score will accord with Professor Frankfurter's remains to be seen.
Still, the difference of vantage points continues to make the problem as simple
for the cloistered professors as it is difficult for the jurists. Thus, Professor
Currie tells us:
"I take it to be the general understanding that Mr. Justice Brandeis' invo-
cation of the Constitution as a basis for overruling Swift v. Tyson was a
bit of judicial hyperbole which, having served its purpose, should not be
permitted to mislead even the most literal-minded reader. It is difficult
to take seriously any objection to a general power to prescribe rules of
decision for the federal courts in the face of the clear language of the
Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power . . .To make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. ' 62
On the other hand, Professors Hart and Wechsler, with equal certainty if less
detail, assert that Erie must be what it says it is, the expression of a constitu-
tional principle.63 In their admirable casebook, they suggest that it is not
"consistent with the purposes of the Constitution to have two sets of rules
about these basic and primary matters-one for co-citizens and diverse citizens
who cannot [or do not] get into federal court, and the other for diverse citizens
who can [and do] ."64 Nor, they seem to say, is it "consistent with the theory
60. Id. at 529-30.
61. See text at note 49 supra.
62. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Ci. L. REv. 405, 468-69
(1955), condensed in The Erie Doctrine and Transfers of Cizil Actions, 17 F.R.D. 353,
372 (1955). See also Clark, State Law in, the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALn L.J. 267, 273, 278 (1946) ; Dodd, The Decreasing Importance
of State Lines, 27 A.B.A.J. 78, 83 (1941.); McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "Gen-
cral" Law in the Federal Courts, 33 IL. L. REv. 126, 135 (1938). Professor Broh-Kahn
wrote a more elaborate brief in support of this position. Broh-Kahn, Amendzent by De-
cision-More on the Erie Case, 30 Ky. L.J. 3 (1941).
63. Wechsler, supra note 51, at 239 nn.19 & 21; Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 COLUms. L. REv. 489, 509-13 (1954). See also Bowman, The Unconsti-
tntionality of the Ride of Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L. REv. 659 (1938).
64. HART & WEcISLER 616.
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of the Constitution to have the federal courts declaring primary law, in dis-
regard of state court decisions, with respect to matters as to which the state
legislatures rather than Congress have legislative competence."' 65 But vague
talk about "the ideals of federalism '66 and "consistency" with "the purposes of
the Constitution" or the "theory of the Constitution" beg the question rather
than answer it. The proponents of the constitutional theme must answer many
questions to sustain the limitation they would assert. The most important of
these questions are the ones raised by Mr. Justice Reed in his Erie opinion-
questions which the majority in that case did not deign to answer: Why is
it not true, as Professor Currie asserts, that the combination of the judicial
article and the "necessary and proper" clause creates power in Congress to
make the rules of decision for diversity cases, just as the combination has
been held to create such power in other instances, notably in the field of
admiralty and maritime law? Again, if the Constitution did not purport to
vest in the federal government the power to make rules of decision for diversity
cases, why did the framers of the almost contemporaneous First Judiciary Act
set forth the limitations on judicial power contained in section thirty-four?
The response to the first question might be framed in terms of the sug-
gestion that the Court has always recognized a fundamental difference be-
tween the grant of diversity jurisdiction and the other grants of judicial power
contained in article three. This distinction, the argument would run, warrants
the difference in constitutional analysis.67 Admiralty, as the analogue most
often drawn upon by those who reject the constitutional basis for the Erie
rule, furnishes a relevant example. Although Congress has there exercised
the legislative power with the approval of the Court, the federal courts have
been recognized as the superior power whose decisions are binding on the
state courts. 68 This superiority has certainly not been recognized for federally-
created doctrines in diversity cases. Moreover, Congress can authorize review
by the Supreme Court of state decisions involving only questions of admiralty
65. Id. at 616-17.
66. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 489,
513 (1954). The Australian example makes it clear that a federal nation can leave this
power in the hands of the national judiciary without courting destruction of the "ideals
of federalism." See Ross, The Constitutional Law of Federalism in the United States and
Australia: 1I, 29 VA. L. Rav. 1028, 1031-33 (1943).
67. The distinction is certainly suggested by the questions in HART & WECHSLER 617.
68. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15
(1917), the Court wrote: "Article III, § 2, of the Constitution, extends the judicial power
of the United States 'To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;' and Article I,
§ 8, confers upon the Congress, power 'To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by
this Constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or officer
thereof.' Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as settled doctrine
that, in consequence of these provisions, Congress has paramount power to fix and determine
the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country. . . . And further, that in
the absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the
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and maritime matters.69 This power cannot be exercised with regard to state
court decisions resolving nonfederal questions, at least in those cases in which
the parties are citizens of the same state.70 In short, under the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, the federal courts together with Congress can, according
to the Court's decisions, formulate a uniform system of law binding on all
courts within the country. No such uniformity is possible, absent acceptance
of Professor Crosskey's thesis-the supremacy of the federal judiciary to make
law, 71 with regard to those matters which are the subject of controversy in
diversity cases.
Still another, if less likely, answer to the first question is theoretically
possible: Erie not only established lack of power in the federal government
to make rules of decision for diversity cases but impaired Congress's power
to promulgate rules of decision for admiralty and maritime cases as well.7 2
federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." See also Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his famed dissent in the Jensen case wrote: "The common law
is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign
or quasi-sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with which I have
disagreed seem to me to have forgotten the fact. It always is the law of some State, and
if the District Courts adopt the common law of torts, as they have shown a tendency
to do, they thereby assume that a law not of maritime origin, and deriving its authority
in that territory only from some particular State of this Union, also governs maritime
torts in that territory-and if the common law, the statute law has at least equal force as
the discussion in The Osceola assumes. On the other hand the refusal of the District Courts
to give remedies coextensive with the common law would prove no more than that they
regarded their jurisdiction as limited by the ancient lines-not that they doubted that the
common law might and would be enforced in the courts of the States as it always has
been. This court has recognized that in some cases different principles of liability would
be applied as the suit should happen to be brought in a common-law or admiralty court ....
But hitherto it has not been doubted authoritatively, so far as I know, that even when
the admiralty had a rule of its own to which it adhered ... the state law, common or
statute, would prevail in the courts of the State. Happily such conflicts are few." Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra at 2-2-23.
It may readily be seen that the dissent in Jensen has had a far more pronounced
effect on the progeny of Erie than did Erie itself or the dissents on which it relied. Cf.
FRANKFURTER & SHULMAN, CASES ON FEDERAL JURISDICrION AND PROCEDURE 178 n.la,
185 n.3 (rev. ed. 1937).
Of course, in admiralty cases, as elsewhere, the federal authority framing the appro-
priate governing rules may choose to apply state law though it is not compelled to do so.
See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Mishkin, supra
note 38.
69. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). But see Caldarola
v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.). It should be noted, however, that the
Court in Caldarola did not dismiss the writ but affirmed the judgment below.
70. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874); RomErsoN & KIRKHA2,
JURISDIcTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 89-103 (2d ed., Wolfson
& Kurland 1951).
71. See note 43 supra.
72. Compare the suggestion that Congress does not have the power to formulate
rules of decision in cases to which the United States is a party. Mishkin, supra note 38,
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In other words, the reasoning proceeds from the absence of power in diversity
cases to an absence of power in admiralty cases rather than from a power
to act in admiralty cases to a power to act in diversity cases. Thus, Mr. Justice
Black, in an address to the Missouri Bar Association, said: "This decision
[Erie] . . .did not answer all questions. For example, . . . the extension
of the doctrine to admiralty jurisdiction [has] not yet been finally deter-
mined."17 3 And Mr. Justice Jackson, then Solicitor General, wrote: "If the
constitutional issue had been argued, the Court would have had to consider
the interesting question whether its decision undermines the foundation of the
rule of uniformity in maritime law, which also depends on a simple grant of
jurisdiction to the Federal courts in the Constitution."74 However admiralty
cases in the Court since Erie give no hint that this alternative is now a real
possibility. Indeed, Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Pope & Talbot v. Hawn
makes clear that for the present at least, Erie has not impaired the federal
powers in the admiralty and maritime field.7
Mr. Justice Reed's second question--concerning the need for section thirty-
four if the Constitution commanded application of state law in diversity cases
-also requires consideration of several answers. Charles Warren, whose re-
searches on the subject are in part responsible for the Erie decision, 70 said
as to the inclusion of section thirty-four:
"Unquestionably the addition of this Section was intended to remove the
objection of those who had opposed the Constitution and which had been
expressed in 1787 by a prominent Massachusetts man as follows:
'Causes of all kinds between citizens of different States are to be tried
before a Continental Court. The Court is not bound to try it according
to the local laws where the controversies happen; for in that case it may
as well be tried in the State Court. The rule which is to govern the new
Courts must therefore be made by the Court itself or by its employees,
the Congress .... Congress, therefore, have the right to make rules for
trying all kinds of questions relating to property between citizens of differ-
ent States .... The right to appoint such Courts necessarily involves in
it the right of defining their powers and determining the rules by which
their judgment shall be regulated .... It is vain to tell us that a maxim
of common law required contracts to be determined by the law existing
where the contract was made; for it is also a maxim that the Legislature
has the right to alter the common law.' "77
at 799 n.10; cf. Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 486 (1946) ; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S.
508 (1893), 162 U.S. 255, 278-79 (1896).
73. Address by Mr. Justice Black, Missouri Bar Ass'n Annual Banquet, Sept. 25,
1942, reprinted in 13 Mo. B.J. 173, 175 (1942).
74. Jackson, "The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson," 24 A.B.A.J. 609, 644 (1938).
75. 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in a separate opinion). See
Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARv. L. REv.
246 (1950); Comment, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 312 (1948).
76. See 304 U.S. at 72-73.
77. Warren, New Light on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAyRv. L. REv.
49, 84 (1923), quoted in FXNKFUR=TR AND SHULMAN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 186.
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Unfortunately, the Warren article does not clearly reveal whether the con-
struction given the Constitution by the "prominent Massachusetts man"78 is
an accurate description of federal power with regard to diversity cases as
understood by the Framers, and the section was therefore inserted to limit
the exercise of the power so described, or whether the section was inserted to
alleviate fears which had no real basis. John Marshall, as Mr. Justice Frank-
furter has pointed out, presented a different view to the Virginia Convention:
"Responding to George Mason's question as to what law would apply
in federal courts in diversity cases, Marshall declared: 'By the laws of
which state will it be determined? said he. By the laws of the state where
the contract was made. According to those laws, and those only, can it
be decided. Is this a novelty? No; it is a principle in the jurisprudence
of this commonwealth.' 3 Elliott's Debates, 556." 70
But again, we are in no position to know whether Chief Justice Marshall was
reciting constitutional law or merely stating a principle of the conflict of laws
as he knew it. His reference to "this commonwealth" is equally ambiguous.
Another answer to the second question is hardly an answer at all: that
section thirty-four was merely declaratory of the law which would have existed
in the absence of the statute.80 Mr. Justice Frankfurter again quotes Marshall
on this score:
"In Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 492, 525, Chief Justice
Marshall, in discussing the applicability of Ohio occupant law as 'rules
of decision' under § 34, said, 'The laws of the states, and the occupant
law, like others, would be so regarded independent of that special enact-
ment.' "81
But again we do not know whether Marshall was talking about the constitu-
tional command or about a principle of the conflict of laws relating to real
property. Certainly, this was not the rule he applied for the Court in Huide-
koper's Lessee v. Douglass.
8 2
Still another explanation of the insertion of section thirty-four, consistent
with the interpretation of Erie as a constitutional doctrine, is that the section
did not purport to relate solely to diversity cases but to all cases in the federal
courts. Such a rule would not be merely declaratory of the principles of the
78. Cited by Warren, supra note 77, at 84 n.80, as: "Letters of Agrippa" (James
Winthrop), Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 11, 14, 1787.
79. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 104 n.2 (1945) ; see Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 n.2 (1938).
80. See Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1923) ; quotation from York
in text at note 32 supra.
81. See note 79 supra.
82. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805). Hart and Wechsler dispose of this case on the
ground that the contrary decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which Marshall
ignored were rendered at a time when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was not the
highest court of the state. HART & WECESLER 615. This is hardly an adequate answer
unless only the highest court of a state can pronounce the law of the state. See text at
notes 90-120 infra. Cf. 2 CRossKEY, POLITICS AND THE CoNsnTrUTIoN 719-53 (1953).
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Constitution, unless state rules of decision constitutionally must govern all
nondiversity cases, where the federal statute is silent, as well as diversity cases,
a thesis hardly consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions to date.8 3
On the evidence as it now stands, the constitutional basis for the Erie
doctrine is, at best, unclear. Under these circumstances, the Court's avoidance
of the question when possible seems appropriate. Should the Court be forced
to face the issue by a congressional enactment purporting to make a substantive
rule of decision for diversity cases, the limitations on the Court's powers of
judicial review-a dominant policy at least since the late- 1930's-might call
for rejection of the constitutional thesis. "We must, of course, defer to the
strong presumption-even as to such technical matters as federal jurisdiction
-that Congress legislated in accordance with the Constitution. ' '8 4 In the
meantime, the Court is likely to continue to apply with some rigidity what
it conceives to be the spirit of the Erie rule, even in the absence of constitu-
tional or statutory compulsion.
85
ERIE AND THE ASCERTAINMENT OF STATE LAW
"We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law,
because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed
the sacrifice." -Swayne, J., in Gelpcke v. Dubuque,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206-07 (1864).
judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a
paste-pot." -Corbin, The Laws of the Several States,
50 YALE L.J. 763, 775 (1941).
The obligation of the federal courts to determine and apply state law did
not originate with the decision in the Erie case. 86 Even under the rule of Swift
v. Tyson, some questions were still to be governed by state rules of decisions 7
And the problem has existed in nondiversity cases as well.88 Erie merely
enlarged the area for application of a "state law" which, our most eminent
83. See, e.g., the cases treated in Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Com-
petence and Discretion in the Choice of Natioal and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 797 (1957).
84. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 348
U.S. 437, 452-53 (1954) ; cf. Rutledge, J., in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582, 622 (1954) (concurring opinion) ; Frankfurter, J., id. at 655 (dissenting
opinion). But see Jackson, 3., id. at 585: "The considerations which bid us strictly to apply
the Constitution to congressional enactments which invade fundamental freedoms or which
reach for powers that would substantially disturb the balance between the Union and its
component states, are not present here." (Emphasis added.)
85. See, e.g., DeCastro v. Board of Comm'rs, 322 U.S. 451 (1944); Waialua Agri-
culture Co. v. Christian, 305 U.S. 91 (1938).
86. See text at note 92 infra.
87. See HART & WEcrsIax 617-19, 620-21.
88. For some recent examples, see DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) ; Estate
of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
[Vol. 67 :187
19571 JUSTICE FRANKFURTER-THE ERIE DOCTRINE 205
federal trial judge says, "most of the time . . . is readily ascertainable."' 9
Nonetheless, since Erie, the Court has felt more pressure to attempt to estab-
lish guide lines for the lower courts to follow. In responding to this demand,
the Court has sought to answer two questions. First, what action of the state
legislatures or courts should be regarded as binding on the federal judiciary?
Second, where within the federal judicial system should the ultimate responsi-
bility lie for determining the appropriate state rules of decision? Both ques-
tions hark back to the Erie opinion.
Controlling Declarations of State Law
"[W]hether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal con-
cern." 90 Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis seemed to assert two guiding authorities
for the state rules of decision in federal courts, the state legislature and the
state high court. In the Ruhlin case,91 however, the question was immediately
presented whether decisions of lower state courts were also; to be considered
binding on the federal courts. Mr. Justice Reed, in a unanimous opinion
written for the Court observed:
"It is not necessary here to consider whether, in the determination of
the substantive Pennsylvania rule, the Circuit Court of Appeals was
correct in declining to follow the nisi prius Thomas case, directly in point,
and in applying the Guise case, which was decided by an intermediate
appellate court ....
"Application of the 'state law' to -the present case, or any other contro-
versy controlled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, does not present the disput-
ants with duties difficult or strange. The parties and the federal courts
must now search for and apply the entire body of substantive law govern-
ing an identical situation in the state courts. Hitherto, even in what were
termed matters of 'general' law, counsel had to investigate the enactments
of the state legislature. Now they must merely broaden their inquiry to
include decisions of state courts, just as they would in a case tried in
the state court, and just as they always have done in actions brought
in the federal courts involving what were known as matters of 'local'
law."
9 2
Such reference to the past and the generalized admonition to apply "the entire
body of substantive law governing an identical situation in the state courts"
did not commend themselves to the lower federal courts, which, at that time
at least, appeared generally to resent the Erie doctrine. Assuming their dignity
to be at stake, they preferred the Brandeis reference to the state's "highest
courts" as the only state judicial body that they must regard as their "su-
perior"; and this view received reinforcement from the Court's opinion in
89. WYZANSKI, A TRIAL JuDGE's FREEDO- AWD RE PONSIBILITy 22 (1952).
90. 304 U.S. at 78.
91. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
92. Id. at 207-09.
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Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank.93 That case was begun in a Texas
trial court and appealed to the state high court, which wrote an opinion dispos-
ing of the issue presented. On remand to the trial court, additional parties were
joined, and the case was removed to the federal courts. Meanwhile, the Texas
supreme court wrote another opinion on the same subject, which seemed
to conflict with the one it had rendered in the Wichita case; it also denied
a petition for rehearing in Wichita. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit chose to follow the second Texas supreme court opinion. The United
States Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals had the right idea but
had applied it erroneously: the second opinion was somehow distinguishable
from the Wichita case. In the course of his opinion for a unanimous Court, Mr.
Justice Stone wrote:
"In departing from the 'law of the case,' as announced by the state
court, and applying a different rule, the court below correctly stated that
by reason of the removal it had been substituted for the Texas Supreme
Court as the appropriate court of appeal and that it was its duty to apply
the Texas law as the Texas court would have declared and applied it on
a second appeal if the cause had not been removed. It was the duty
of the federal court to apply the law of Texas as declared by its highest
court.... And since the Supreme Court of Texas holds itself free upon
reconsideration to modify or recede from its own opinions . . . the court
below, in applying the local law, was likewise free to depart from earlier
rulings to the extent that examination of later opinions of the Texas
Supreme Court showed that it had modified its opinion on the first
appeal.
'94
Thus, the Court seemed to be saying that the lower federal courts were to act
as though they were the highest court of the state in which the action was com-
menced, except that they were rigidly bound by stare decisis with regard to
the opinions of that court.
Such a construction of the Erie rule did not last long. The issue was avoided
in Cities Ser'. Oil Co. v. Dunlap,95 where the successful petitioner relied on
an intermediate appellate court opinion, which in turn seemed to find support
in a state high court judgment. But in the 1940 Term, the Court accepted
a series of cases involving the question more directly and in several different
forms. Four of these were argued consecutively in November 1940; and the
first of them, Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,9 6 set the tone for all. Here,
a clear conflict existed between the act of the state legislature, which Mr.
Justice Brandeis had suggested as one of the governing criteria, and the de-
cisions of two trial courts, rulings which had not received similar approbation
in the Erie opinion.
After local courts had rejected the Totten trust device, the New Jersey
legislature passed a series of statutes validating such informal trusts. Two
93. 306 U.S. 103 (1939).
94. Id. at 107.
95. 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
96. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
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New Jersey chancery court decisions-decisions by courts of first instance--
held that, despite the clear language of the statutes, Totten trusts were still
not to be recognized by New Jersey law. When the Field case came before
it, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the chancery
decisions did not "truly express the state law,' 97 and applied the statutes as
they read. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
unanimously reversed this decision:
"The highest state court is the final authority of state law ...but it is
still the duty of the federal courts, where the state law supplies the rule
of decision, to ascertain and apply that law even though it has not been
expounded by the highest court of the State. . . . An intermediate
state court in declaring and applying the state law is acting as an organ
of the state and its determination, in the absence of more convincing
evidence of what the state law is, should be followed by a federal court
in deciding a state question. We have declared that principle in West v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.[98]....
".... [Jjudicial action in this instance has been taken by the Chancery
Court of New Jersey and we have no other evidence of the state law in
this relation. Equity decrees in New Jersey are entered by the Chancellor,
who constitutes the Court of Chancery, upon the advice of the Vice-
Chancellors, and these decrees, like the judgments of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, are subject to review only by the Court of Errors and
Appeals. We have held that the decisions of the [New Jersey] Supreme
Court upon the construction of a state statute should be followed in the
absence of an expression of a countervailing view by the State's highest
court ... and we think that the decisions of the Court of Chancery are
entitled to like respect as announcing the law of the State.
"While, of course, the decisions of the Court of Chancery are not bind-
ing on the Court of Errors and Appeals, a uniform ruling either by the
Court of Chancery or by the Supreme Court over a course of years will
not be set aside by the highest court 'except for cogent and important
reasons.' . . . It appears that ordinarily the decisions of the Court of
Chancery, if they have not been disapproved, are treated as binding in
later cases in chancery. . . but there is always, as respondent urges, the
possibility that a particular decision of the Court of Chancery will not be
followed by the Supreme Court . . . or even by the Court of Chancery
itself."09
This was a reversal of Swift v. Tyson with a vengeance. The judicial opinions
of two vice-chancellors were to be binding on the federal courts, although
they directly contradicted the state legislature. Thus, the federal courts in
diversity cases were not to act, as suggested in Wichita, as would the highest
court of the state rigidly limited by stare decisis; they were to be bound by
decisions of state courts of first instance, decisions which were not even bind-
ing on other state courts of first instance. For, despite the language of the
97. Id. at 177. Later New Jersey courts chose to follow the Third Circuit ruling
rather than the decisions of the chancery courts relied on by the Supreme Court. See Clark,
supra note 62, at 292.
98. 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
99. 311 U.S. at 177-79.
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opinion, the case clearly did not involve decisions by an intermediate appellate
court, nor did it concern "a uniform ruling.., by the Court of Chancery ...
over a course of years." The decisions were controlling because, in spite of
the statutory language, they stood "as the only exposition of the law of the
State."100
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes also wrote for a unanimous Court which, in Six
Companies v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, reversed a circuit court for disre-
garding what that court believed to be a dictum by a California appellate
court.10 1 The Supreme Court held that the supposed dictum was really a
holding and thus binding on the federal courts:
"The decision in the Sinnott case was made in 1919. We have not
been referred to any decision of the Supreme Court of California to the
contrary. We thus have an announcement of the state law by an inter-
mediate appellate court in California in a ruling which apparently has
not been disapproved, and there is no convincing evidence that the law
of the State is otherwise."'102
In West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., which Mr. Chief Justice Hughes had
used to bolster his opinions in both the Six Companies and the Field cases,
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, as the spokesman for the Court, announced a more
reasonable and less mechanical rule:
"A state is not without law save as its highest court has declared it.
There are many rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by
the bar and inferior courts which are nevertheless laws of the state al-
though the highest court of the state has never passed upon them. In
those circumstances a federal court is not free to reject the state rule
merely because it has not received the sanction of the highest state court,
even though it thinks the rule unsound in principle or that another is
preferable. State law is to be applied in the federal as well as the state
courts and it is the duty of the former in every case to ascertain from
all available data what the state law is and apply it rather than to pre-
scribe a different rule, however superior it may appear ... ,
Unfortunately, however, he did not stop here, but went on to the rule of
thumb doctrine of Field and Six Companies:
"True, some courts of appeals of Ohio may in some other case arrive at a
different conclusion and the Supreme Court of Ohio, notwithstanding its
refusal to review the state decision against the petitioner may hold itself
free to modify or reject the ruling thus announced. . . . Even though
it is arguable that the Supreme Court of Ohio will at some later date
modify the rule of the West case, whether that will ever happen remains
a matter of conjecture.'
0 4
100. Id. at 179. Cf. Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 152 n.10 (1947) ; Huron Hold-
ing Co. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 189 n.7 (1941.).
101. 311 U.S. 180 (1940).
102. Id. at 188. Presumably even as a dictum, the assertion should be taken as strong
evidence of state law in the absence of contrary holdings. See text at notes 117, 11S
infra. For discussion of the lower court cases, see Note, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1299 (1946).
103. 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
104. Id. at 237-38.
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Only Mr. Justice Roberts dissented, but not on the question of what opinions
of state tribunals are binding on the federal courts. He simply read the Ohio
opinions differently from his brethren. In the fourth case,10 5 Mr. Justice
Murphy, writing for a unanimous court, relied on the earlier cases for the
proposition that federal courts are bound to follow intermediate appellate
court decisions.
In Vandenbark v. Owens Ill. Glass Co., 00 the Court announced a rule
already indicated by the opinion in the Wichita case. Where a federal court
judgment rests on a state court decision which the state court modified while
the federal case was on appeal, the federal appellate court must apply the later
state court ruling. After dealing with apparently inconsistent language in
earlier Supreme Court opinions, Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for a Court in
which there was no dissent, said:
"[T]he dominant principle is that nisi prius and appellate tribunals alike
should conform their orders to the state law as of the time of the entry.
Intervening and conflicting decisions will thus cause the reversal of judg-
ments which were correct when entered.
.... While not insensible to possible complications, we are of the
view that, until such time as a case is no longer sub judice, the duty rests
upon the federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision
statute in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest
state courts [or intermediate appellate courts]. Any other conclusion
would but perpetuate the confusion and injustices arising from incon-
sistent federal and state interpretations of state law.'
0 7
Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R.10 8 also revisited the problem of the Wichita case.
Moore had once gone up to the high state court, which passed on the issue
later raised between the same parties in a diversity action in the federal courts.
The circuit court of appeals, considering itself the equivalent of the Mississippi
supreme court, decided that it could reverse the position taken by that court
in the earlier appeal. The Supreme Court shortly dispelled the court of
appeals' delusions of grandeur in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black:
"The Mississippi Supreme Court had the power to reconsider and over-
rule its former interpretation, but the court below did not. And, in the
absence of a change by the Mississippi legislature, the court below could
reconsider and depart from the ruling of the highest court of Mississippi
on Mississippi's statute of limitations only to the extent, if any, that ex-
amination of the later opinions of the Mississippi Supreme Court showed
that it had changed its earlier interpretation of the effect of the Mississippi
statute."' 09
A few years later, the Court felt compelled to back away from an extension
of this mechanical jurisprudence to its ultimate extreme. In King v. United
105. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
106. 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
107. Id. at 543. See also Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944) ; Carter Oil Co.
v. Welker, 317 U.S. 592 (1942) ; Chase Securities Corp. v. Vogel, 312 U.S. 666 (1941).
103. 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
109. Id. at 633.
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Commercial Travelers,110 the refusal of the lower federal court to follow a
decision of a South Carolina court of common pleas was sustained by the
Supreme Court. In an opinion for a unanimous Court, Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson said:
"In the first place, a Court of Common Pleas does not appear to have
such importance and competence within South Carolina's own judicial
system that its decisions should be taken as authoritative exposition of
that State's 'law.' In future cases between different parties, as indicated
above, a Common Pleas decision does not exact conformity from either
the same court or lesser courts within its territorial jurisdiction; and it
may apparently be ignored by other Courts of Common Pleas without
the compunctions which courts often experience in reaching results di-
vergent from those reached by another court of coordinate jurisdiction.
... [I] t would be incongruous indeed to hold the federal court bound by
a decision which would not be binding on any state court."''
But apparently fearing that this license might be unreasonably indulged, the
Chief Justice added a "second place" that the common pleas decisions were
unreported and therefore not generally available except by a search of the
judgment rolls. In addition, he cautioned:
"Nor is our decision to be taken as promulgating a general rule that
federal courts need never abide by determinations of state law by state
trial courts. As indicated by the Fidelity Union Trust Co. case, other
situations in other states may well call for a different result."
1 2
Thus the Court seemed to arrive at a rule to the effect that high court
and intermediate court judgments of the state judiciary were regularly binding
on the federal courts, but nisi prius decisions were binding only to the extent
that they bound other state nisi prius courts. However, a footnote in a later
Supreme Court decision suggested that the line is between "local courts" and
those that are part of a "system of State courts"; only the decisions of the
former are not binding on federal courts.113
In the cases after Ruhlin, Mr. Justice Frankfurter silently concurred in all
that the Court said." 4 In his 1928 article, he had indicated that he believed
state law to be something more than the combination of the state's statutes
and high court decisions. 11 But in the Bernhardt case, he suggested for the
first time that the function of the federal courts in diversity cases was greater
than the exercise of the slot-machine techniques which had received the appro-
bation of the Supreme Court in the Ruhlin line of decisions."6 There, the
question was whether the law of Vermont would honor an arbitration clause
in a New York contract. The majority, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas,
1,10. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
111. Id. at 161.
112. Id. at 162.
113. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 753 n.23 (1950).
114. He concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion in Moore v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 636 (1941).
115. See text at note 59 supra.
116. 350 U.S. at 198.
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held that the Vermont law would not so effectuate the agreement of the parties
over the objection of one of them and affirmed the reliance by the district court
on two Vermont high court decisions, the first announced in 1803, the second
in 1910.
"[T]here appears to be no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no de-
veloping line of authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones,
no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of the Vermont judges on
the question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the
judicial rule.""
7
For Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a look behind these decisions to determine
whether the Vermont law of 1956 really was what it had been in 1910 was
essential:
"As long as there is diversity jurisdiction, 'estimates' are necessarily
often all that federal courts can make in ascertaining what the state court
would rule to be its law. See Ponzerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341....
[TIhe mere fact that Vermont in 1910 restated its old law against deny-
ing equitable relief for breach of a promise to arbitrate a contract made
under such Vermont law, is hardly a conclusive ground for attributing
to the Vermont Supreme Court application of this equitable doctrine in
1956 to a contract made in New York with explicit agreement by the
parties that the law of New York which allows such a stay as was here
sought, New York Civil Practice Act § 1451, should govern... . Law
does change with times and circumstances, and not merely through
legislative reforms. It is also to be noted that law is not restricted to
what is found in Law Reports, or otherwise written.... The Supreme
Court of Vermont last spoke on this matter in 1910. The doctrine that
it referred to was not a peculiar indigenous Vermont rule. The attitude
reflected by that decision nearly half a century ago was the current tra-
ditional judicial hostility against ousting courts, as the phrase ran, of
their jurisdiction. . . .To be sure, a vigorous legislative movement got
under way in the 1920's expressive of a broadened outlook of view on
this subject. But courts do not always wait for legislation to find a
judicial doctrine outmoded. Only last Term, although we had no statute
governing an adjudication, we found significance in a relevant body of
enactments elsewhere: 'A steady legislative trend, presumably manifest-
ing a strong social policy, properly makes demands on the judicial
process.' National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360.
' '11
Both the majority and Mr. Justice Frankfurter thus indicated that the
lower courts are to have the shackles loosened, if not removed. Law is not
merely what the last state court judicial opinion says it is. The area of relevant
"convincing evidence of what a state law is"" 9 would appear to have been
broadened by the action of the Court in this case. Other rulings of the Court
strengthen the suggestion that the automaton doctrine has been rejected.
1 2
117. Id. at 205.
118. Id. at 209-12. Cf. Black, J., dissenting in Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S.
445, 451 (1948).
119. See text following note 97 supra.
120. In Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 350 U.S. 1003 (1956),
which was argued the same day that the Bernhardt case was decided, the issue was whether
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So long as the rigidities of the Field and King opinions prevailed, the Court
had substituted one kind of forum shopping for another in diversity cases.
Those who sought to have the state law applied as it was last stated by a state
court would choose the federal forum to entertain the case, since the federal
courts were unable to mold the law to new demands. Those who sought the
possibility of having a new or amended doctrine applied to their cause would
equally certainly choose the state forum, for only that tribunal would have
power to offer the relief such a litigant would be seeking.
With this rigidity removed, certain problems remain. The Court has been
fully cognizant of the difficulty of ascertaining state law. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, for example, stated in his opinion in the Bernhardt case that the Erie
rule makes a choice between two evils:
"One of the difficulties, of course, resulting from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
is that it is not always easy and sometimes difficult to ascertain what the
governing state law is. The essence of the doctrine of that case is that
the difficulties of ascertaining state law are fraught with less mischief
than disregard of the basic nature of diversity jurisdiction, namely, the
enforcement of state-created rights and state policies going to the heart
of those rights."'
121
But federal court incapacity to make law under Erie was not so great as some
commentators would contend. Thus, when the Seventh Circuit confronted
the issue whether children had stated a valid claim for damages against a
woman who caused their father to leave his family and refuse them support,
it found no Illinois decisions on the subject and rejected the implications of
the state's "heart balm" statute.1 22 "Because such rights have not heretofore
been recognized is not a cotclusive reason for denying them.'1 2 3 And, while
the problem of ascertaining state law appears with perhaps the greatest fre-
quency in diversity cases, it is by no means limited to those cases nor even
to cases in which a federal court is seeking to apply the law of a state in which
the action was commenced. To quote judge Wyzanski again:
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had properly followed state court decisions
on the question whether the defendant was "doing business" for purposes of personal
jurisdiction in the northern district of Illinois. The Illinois decisions relied on by the
Seventh Circuit in rejecting personal jurisdiction were rendered prior to the Supreme
Court's opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and the
cases which thereafter broadened the power of the states in this area. The petitioner
argued that the Illinois courts would apply a different rule than that which had prevailed
before the International Shoe case, though it could refer to no Illinois decision in support
of its thesis. The Court, in a per curiam opinion which effectively concealed its ground
for decision, ruled in petitioner's favor on the question of personal jurisdiction. It might
thus have been expressing a view that recognizes state law to be something other than
what the last reported judicial decision states it to be.
121. 350 U.S. at 208-09. Cf. Black, J., in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 144
n.5 (1952) ; DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 102 (1956).
122. Daily v. Parker, 152 F2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). See Fitzgerald, The Celebrated
Case of Daily v. Parker, 15 U. KAN. CITy L. REv. 120 (1947).
123. Daily v. Parker, supra note 122, at 177. Compare the more cautious approach of
the Supreme Court in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 322 U.S. 301 (1947).
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"[Tihis is part of a larger problem of the twentieth century judicial
emphasis on conflict of laws. Every time judges are called upon to apply
the law of a foreign jurisdiction are they not inclined to give undue weight
to the recorded landmarks and to underestimate the mobile qualities and
thrusts of principle we discern in our domestic law ?-124
Several mechanical solutions are possible to the problem of inequality re-
sulting from the inferior capacity-power, not ability--of federal courts to
frame state law in diversity cases. The first is at the same time the most ex-
treme and the most desirable: abolition of diversity jurisdiction. 2 5 The second
has already been rejected by the Court: the possibility of a federal court's
refraining from the exercise of jurisdiction in those cases where it finds itself
unable to ascertain accurately the law of the state involved. In Meredith v.
Winter Haven, Mr. Chief Justice Stone wrote the opinion in which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter joined:
"Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . did not free the federal courts from
the duty of deciding questions of state law in diversity cases. Instead
it placed on them a greater responsibility for determining and applying
state law in all cases within their jurisdiction in which federal law does
not govern. Accepting this responsibility, as was its duty, this Court
has not hestitated to decide questions of state law when necessary for
the disposition of a case brought to it for decisions, although the highest
court of the state had not answered them, the answers were difficult, and
the character of the answers which the highest state courts might ulti-
matel3i give remained uncertain. . . . Even though our decisions could
not finally settle the question of state law involved, they did adjudicate
the rights of the parties with the aid of such light as was afforded by the
materials at hand, and in accordance with the applicable principles for
determining state law. In this case, as in those, it being within the juris-
diction conferred by Congress, we think the plaintiffs, petitioners here,
were entitled to have such an adjudication."'126
That the Court need not have ruled that the grant of diversity jurisdiction
compels its exercise is evidenced by the refusal of the federal courts to resolve
issues of domestic relations and probate matters, even though jurisdictional
requirements are met.'27 Justices Black and Jackson dissented from the Court's
ruling in Meredith. And Mr. Justice Frankfurter has since indicated doubts
about the result in which he once concurred. 28 The Court might do well
to take another look at that case.
A third answer to the difficulties of the federal courts in ascertaining state
law is closely related to the second. Under this solution, federal court proceedings
124. WYZANSKI, A TRIAL JUDGE'S FREEDOM AND REsroxsIBILiTY 23 (1952).
125. See text at notes 51-53 supra.
126. 320 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1943). See also Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326
U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946).
127. See HART & WECHSLER 1013-18. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 504 (1947).
128. See Frankfurter, J., in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53
(1954).
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might be stayed pending a determination of the state law in the state courts.
The Court has followed this procedure in nondiversity cases. 129 But without
adequate explanation, it has rejected such an approach in a diversity case,
over the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.130
The fourth possibility, offering the greatest promise, is to have the federal
intermediate appellate court certify the troublesome question of state law to
the state high court for resolution. Such an opportunity has been afforded the
federal courts by the Florida legislature, although it appears not to have been
utilized. 131 The practice might be adopted through congressional action with-
out the necessity for state enabling legislation.132 In this manner, the court
best equipped to answer the state law questions could do so in a definitive
manner, without the expense of time and resources demanded by a stay of the
federal court proceeding pending a declaratory judgment action in the state
court. Unless the certification process were abused by the federal appellate
courts, it would not unduly burden the state courts; and the equality of
treatment which the Erie rule was aimed to accomplish would be better
assured.
Admittedly, none of these reforms is likely to be effected in the near future.
Thus, the federal courts must continue to exercise the power which the
Bernhardt case implicitly recognizes. Judge Wyzanski's question-"Shall we
seek to evolve the state rules exclusively from the state precedents, some of
which are quite old ... ?"'3 3---ought now to be answered in the negative. As
long as federal judges can be trusted to enforce the Erie rule in the spirit
which brought it forth, the dogma of the Field cases and those which followed
need not control their actions. Indeed, if the Bernhardt case represents a
retreat from such dogma, an explainable cycle may be revealed. The Court,
in Erie, announced a doctrine which left the lower federal courts with the
necessary leeway to apply state law in a constructive manner in the diversity
cases coming before them. On confronting the hostile attitude of those courts
toward the Erie principle, however, the Supreme Court found necessary the
imposition of more rigid and mechanical rules for the ascertainment of state
law. Now, as Erie becomes accepted as an established doctrine and receives
more sympathetic treatment from the lower federal judiciary-a judiciary
whose membership has been radically changed since the initial pronouncement
-the Court seems ready to recognize that the need for tight rein has disap-
peared. Time will reveal whether the language of the Bernhardt case does
represent such a major revision, or whether it is merely an aberration subse-
quently to be ignored. Much may depend on how the lower courts act in the
use of their new freedom.
129. See HART & WEcHSLER 869-73.
130. Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402, 412 (1952) ; cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472,
486, 492 (1949).
131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (Supp. 1956). See Vestal, The Certified Question of
Law, 36 IOWA L. Ray. 629, 643 (1951).
132. See HaRT & WEcnsI.aa 391-99.
133. WYZANSxI, Op. cit. supra note 124, at22.
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Responsibility for Determining State Law
The major conflict between the majority position in Bernhardt and that
taken by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan was over the question whether the
case should be remanded to the district court, which had already passed on
the state law issue, or to the court of appeals, which had not done so because
it had erroneously assumed that federal law was controlling. Both positions
relied on the expertise in the law of Vermont of the court to which they would
remand. The problem of which court within the federal judicial system should
be charged with ultimate responsibility for ascertaining the state law has never
been directly answered by the Court.
Of course, the ultimate power to decide whether state law was properly
applied in a diversity case rests with the Supreme Court itself. The Court's
rules, both before and after Erie, have indicated that one of the factors to
which the Court would give weight in considering a petition for certiorari
was that "a court of appeals ... has decided an important state or territorial
question in a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial law."' 3 4 , The
retention of the power in the Court does not, however, provide a guide as to
when it will be exercised. In nondiversity as well as diversity cases, the Court
has indicated its reliance on lower federal courts for the interpretation of state
law.'13 But in all cases, it has retained the right to reject the interpretation
given by the lower courts to the state law.136
In Erie itself, Mr. Justice Brandeis refused to interpret the Pennsylvania
law which he thought applicable. He remanded the case to the court of appeals
to decide that question, a question which had gone unanswered because the
lower court had ruled that "general" law governed.' 37 And the practice
of remanding for interpretation was followed in all of the early cases under
the Erie doctrine.138
Since that time the Court has undertaken to decide the question of state
law for itself in two situations: where certiorari has been granted to resolve
an alleged conflict between the decision of the court of appeals and the state
law,'2 9 and where, after granting certiorari to decide whether the lower court
134. Sup. Cr. RULE 19(1) (b).
135. See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-92 (1949) ; Spiegel v. Commissioner,
335 U.S. 701, 707-08 (1949); Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1947);
Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629-30 (1946) ; Reitz v. fealy, 314
U.S. 33, 39 (1941); National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178, 180-81 (1937);
Wayne County Bd. v. Great Lakes Steel Co., 300 U.S. 29, 30 (1937).
136. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 112 (1939) ; cf.
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
137. 304 U.S. at 80.
138. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Bowman, 304 U.S. 549 (1938) ; Hudson
v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397 (1938); Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 263
(1938); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261 (1938); Ruhlin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 206-07 (1938).
139. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410 (1941); Texarkana
v. Arkansas, La. Gas. Co., 306 U.S. 188 (1939).
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properly refused to follow certain state court decisions, the Court decided that
the court of appeals erred in rejecting the decisions in question.140 In other
cases, the Court has usually refused to decide the state law issue when the
court of appeals had not first passed on it. If that court had considered the
question, the Supreme Court might reject its ruling,' 41 but has more often
accepted it.142 Where the lower court had not passed on the state question,
the Supreme Court's custom has been to remand to that court for a decision
on the issue.
143
Although the Court has indicated that it will ordinarily be guided by the
lower courts' construction of state law, it has usually not distinguished with
any care between the district court and the court of appeals. At times, it has
spoken of the district court as the best judge of local law.144 At other times,
the courts of appeals have received the accolade. 145 Often, the lower federal
courts have been lumped together as if they were one.146 From these state-
ments only one conclusion may be drawn: for purposes of administering the
federal system, the lower federal courts, not the Supreme Court, will generally
settle state law questions. As the Court said in Huddleston v. Dwyer:
"[O]rdinarily we accept and therefore do not review, save in exceptional
cases, the considered determination of state law by the intermediate federal
appellate courts ...."147
When, however, as in the Bernhardt case, the lower federal court to be
given the final say on the meaning of state law must be identified, no real
guidance may be found in the decisions preceding Bernhardt. If Bernhardt
is to control, the United States district courts are clearly designated. But
the decision certainly did not mean that the views of a district court judge
cannot be reversed by the court of appeals on a question of state law. Probably
the confusing element in these cases, as in Bernhardt, is that deference to the
lower courts is said to be based on their expert knowledge of the law of the
states in which they are located. Mr. Justice Holmes is partially responsible
140. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103 (1939). See Stoner v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
311 U.S. 223 (1940) ; Six Companies v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940).
141. See, e.g., Lyon v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 305 U.S. 484, 485-90
(1939) ; Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Co., 350 U.S. 1003 (1956) (per
curiai decision; semble) ; note 120 mipra.
142. See, e.g., Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948) ; Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U.S. 109 (1943).
143. See, e.g., King v. United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948) ; Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944) ; Mere-
dith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1,943); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 241 (1940); Cities
Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
144. See, e.g., Texarkana v. Arkansas, La. Gas Co., 306 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
145. See, e.g., Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1948) ; Huddleston
v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944).
146. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 118 (1943).
147. 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944).
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for this thesis, which might be valid in so far as foreign law is concerned.
In Diaz v. Gonzales, he said of the Puerto Rican law, which has different roots
from our own: "[To] one brought up within it, varying emphasis, tacit
assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from life,
may give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar
never could have got from the books."' 48 But when the reference is shifted
to the law of the states, with the possible exception of Louisiana, the very
essence of the Erie doctrine is that a federal judge can find, if not make, the
law almost as well as a state judge. Certainly, if the law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky over the United States, neither is it a brooding
omnipresence in the sky of Vermont, or New York or California. The bases
of state law are assumed to be communicable by lawyers to judges, federal
judges no less than state judges.14 ) Congress has adopted this premise in
authorizing the assignment of district judges from one circuit to another.15 0
And the premise is certainly basic to all conflict of laws doctrine, including
the full faith and credit clause. If judicial expertise in the law of the state
in which the district court sits is really to be the test, review of its rulings
on state law ought to be permitted only when the appellate bench is also
made up of judges from the same state jurisdiction. But no such limitation
is proposed.
The real reason for the Supreme Court to bow, and it usually does, to the
decisions on state law of the lower federal courts rests not on the premise of
expertness but on one of economy of judicial administration. As Mr. Justice
Brandeis said in his dissent in Railroad Caonm'n v. Los Angeles Ry. after he
had quoted with approval the Diaz v. Gonzales argument:
"[T] he special province of this Court is the Federal law. The construction
and application of the Constitution of the United States and of the legisla-
tion of Congress is its most important function. In order to give adequate
consideration to the adjudication of great issues of government, it must,
so far as possible, lessen the burden incident to the disposition of cases,
which come here for review."''
1 1
If considerations of judicial administration are to govern, the reason for allow-
ing review on questions of state law in the courts of appeals is the same as
that for permitting review of any question of law in the appellate court. Our
jurisprudence has developed a thesis that a man is entitled as of right to
148. 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923).
149. But cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) : "There is an appro-
priateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the
state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum
untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself."
150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-96 (1952).
151. 280 U.S. 145, 166 (1929). Mr. Justice Brandeis cited in support of this propo-
sition, Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 503 (1928), and Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court at October Term, 1928, 43 HARv. L. REv. 33, 53, 56, 59-62 (1929).
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one appeal; if the thesis is not constitutional, it is at least statutory.' 12 In
Bernhardt, the respondent was denied that opportunity for a review of the
question of Vermont law, since only the district court passed on the issue;
neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit did so.
In short, then, in diversity cases as in others, each of the courts in the
hierarchy of the federal judicial system is entitled to the views of the court
below on the question of state law, as on other questions of law. But the highest
court to pass on the question will have the final say as to the meaning of state law.
Ordinarily, the highest court to pass on the issue will be a court of appeals, since
the Supreme Court's energies must be husbanded for resolution of issues of
greater public importance.
152. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1952); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
